Laval, April 1, 2022 — Teamsters
Canada Rail Conference lost 3 brothers,
Dylan Paradis, Andrew Dockrell and Daniel Waldenberger-Bulmer in the
February 4, 2019, Field Hill derailment, in British Columbia. This
disaster has drastically changed the lives of the families, friends and
co-workers along with our organization forever.
These members of the Teamsters Canada
Rail Conference perished when a loaded grain train ran uncontrolled down
a mountain grade and derailed, after its air brake system failed.
While we cannot bring our brothers
back, we will continue to take all necessary steps to protect lives and
mitigate the risks that rail transportation poses to all of our members
and the general public.
After our initial review of the Rail
Transportation Safety investigation of the Field Hill derailment
released yesterday, we are
satisfied that the TSB conducted a thorough review of the background,
circumstances and causes of this tragedy. We commend the TSB for
identifying all the issues and shortfalls, we thought that the following
points should be reiterated:
Canadian Pacific did not consider that the trend in safety hazard reports represented a “safety concern” per the SMS Regulations and it did not take sufficient action to address the underlying causes of ineffective braking of unit grain trains descending Field Hill in extreme cold temperatures;
If a railway company’s SMS is not supported by a positive safety culture, its effectiveness at identifying and mitigating hazards is reduced, increasing the risk of accidents;
Based on post-occurrence
testing, it is likely that about 52 of the 112 cars on the occurrence
train had reduced air brake effectiveness during the initial descent of
Field Hill, and consequently an emergency brake application was
necessary;
The trainmaster’s
training and experience did not adequately prepare him to evaluate
abnormal circumstances in the complex operating environment of Field
Hill;
After the job briefing, during which there was no discussion of the critical factors such as ambient temperature, brake system performance, and the significance of the applied airflow events that might have prompted the application of hand brakes, the trainmaster decided that setting retainers was sufficient after this first emergency stop.
We trust that the TSB recommendations
will be adopted in order to mitigate the chances of such disaster
occurring again. This report confirms our belief that this tragedy, and
the resulting loss of life was needless and preventable.
We will reserve any further comments
until the ongoing RCMP investigation is complete.
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